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Case studiesOver the past decades, road safety in highly-motorised countries has made signiﬁcant progress. Although we
have a fair understanding of the reasons for this progress, we don't have conclusive evidence for this. A new
generation of road safety management approaches has entered road safety, starting when countries decided to
guide themselves by setting quantitative targets (e.g. 50% less casualties in ten years' time). Setting realistic
targets, designing strategies and action plans to achieve these targets and monitoring progress have resulted in
more scientiﬁc research to support decision-making on these topics. Three subjects are key in this new approach
of evidence-based and data-driven road safety management: ex-post and ex-ante evaluation of both individual
interventions and intervention packages in road safety strategies, and transferability (external validity) of the
research results. In this article, we explore these subjects based on recent experiences in four jurisdictions
(Western Australia, the Netherlands, Sweden and Switzerland). All four apply similar approaches and tools;
differences are considered marginal. It is concluded that policy-making and political decisions were inﬂuenced
to a great extent by the results of analysis and research. Nevertheless, to compensate for a relatively weak
theoretical basis and to improve the power of this new approach, a number of issues will need further research.
This includes ex-post and ex-ante evaluation, a better understanding of extrapolation of historical trends and the
transferability of research results. This new approach cannot be realized without high-quality road safety data.
Good data and knowledge are indispensable for this new and very promising approach.
© 2015 The Authors. Production and hosting by Elsevier Ltd. on behalf of International Association of Trafﬁc and
Safety Sciences. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
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Over the past decades, road safety has continued to improve in
many highly-motorised countries if measured by the number of
road fatalities or road crash mortality rates (fatalities per 100,000
inhabitants), see Fig. 1.al Association of Trafﬁc and Safety Sciences. This is an open access article under the CC BY-
Fig. 1. Changes in number of fatalities 2000–2013 [1].
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the lowest mortality rates or the largest progress are data-driven
problem identiﬁcation and the development of evidence-driven
countermeasure packages formalised in a strategy for effective imple-
mentation, combinedwith ambitious, quantitative targets and transpar-
ent lines of institutional accountability. Road safety management
captures all these components. However, although Johnston's view
seems plausible, the question is whether enough scientiﬁc evidence
can be found to support it.
The question how exactly the implementation of (a multitude of)
road safety interventions has inﬂuenced the positive road safety
developments in many countries, is not easy to answer. In a Special
Issue of Safety Science on Scientiﬁc Research on Road Safety Manage-
ment [3], a variety of approaches from different countries were
presented. Subjects discussed included how to support decision-
making for designing individual safety interventions, how to design
strategies with multiple interventions in which interventions
(could) interact, and how to evaluate implementations of individual
interventions and of implemented strategies. The Editorial to this
Special Issue [4] observed that the design and evaluation of road
safety programmes appear not to be very popular topics amongst
researchers, considering the limited amount of peer-reviews on the
subject. Bax et al. [5] concluded that designers of road safety strate-
gies make hardly any or no use at all of the results of these studies.
However, we see a growing interest from both the research and the
policy-making domains in this area. One of the reasons for this
might be that more and more countries and jurisdictions are setting
quantitative road safety targets (for example 50% less road fatalities
in ten years). Data and knowledge are essential to set realistic
targets. As those who set the targets are held accountable for
reaching those targets, more and more attention is paid to monitor-
ing progress over time and using the results to improve their perfor-
mance further (Wegman & Hagenzieker, 2010).
This article explores three different subjects relevant for road safety
management:
• Ex-post evaluation of individual interventions and of road safety
strategies
• Ex-ante evaluation of individual interventions and of road safety
strategies
• Transferability of research results (external validity).For the exploration of these three subjects, we use the so-called SUN-
ﬂower approach. This approach presents a conceptual framework to ﬁnd
outwhat exactly causes road safety to improve in countries [6]. Koornstra
et al. [7] startedwith a comparisonbetween Sweden, theUnitedKingdom
and the Netherlands. The comparison was later expanded by Wegman
et al. [8] including six other European countries (Greece, Portugal, Spain,
the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland). The methodological approach
is based on a road safety target hierarchy as shown in Fig2 and was
adapted from a consultation document on the Road Safety Strategy
2010 of New Zealand [9]. This approach demands a fundamental under-
standing of trafﬁc safety processes at different levels in the hierarchy of
causes and consequences that lead to casualties (number of people killed
or injured in a road crash) and of changes in them over time.
The vertical dimension is formed by the different levels in the pyra-
mid. We have the ﬁnal outcome of the system on top: i.e. the number
of people killed and injured and the related social-economic costs.
The level of safety measures and programmes reﬂects policy perfor-
mance. Policy performance deals with the quality of a road safety strat-
egy and the quality of its implementation. So, it is a combination of how
well a strategy has been designed (‘evidence-based and data-driven’)
and howwell action plans based on a strategy have been implemented.
Implementation of effective measures should lead to a higher safety
quality of the road trafﬁc system, which is reﬂected by a better design
of system components and better operational trafﬁc conditions.
The indicators at this level are intermediate outcomes between policy
output and the number of casualties (ﬁnal outcomes) (Fig. 3).
Ex-post and ex-ante evaluations deal with the relation between
policy output of interventions (safety measures and programmes) and
ﬁnal outcomes in terms of number of people killed or seriously injured
and the associated social costs. Of course, this relationship should be
a causal one: it should be possible to attribute changes in outcome
indicator values solely to implemented interventions. It is advisable
to distinguish between evaluation of individual interventions and
packages of interventions, as is common practice when designing and
implementing a road safety strategy. In case of ex-ante evaluations,
we have to rely on research results from elsewhere, collected in differ-
ent settings and at different times. The question iswhether these results
can be generalized. In other words: are the research results transferable
and do we consider their so-called external validity to be sufﬁcient?
Sometimes we are able to collect speciﬁc data on the three subjects
(ex-post evaluation, ex-ante evaluation and transferability of results),
Fig. 2. A target hierarchy for road safety (Koornstra et al., 2002, and LTSA, 2000).
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(ofﬁcial) statistics.
In so-called ex-post policy evaluations, one looks backward, and
attempts to estimate the safety effects of implemented interventions
by comparing the observed road safety situation after implementing
certain policies with the (hypothetical) situation where no policies
have been implemented. Unfortunately, double blind, randomized
controlled trials are not a realistic option for road safety research. This
gold standard of evaluation research, as recommended for example in
the Cochrane Reviews for health research (www.cochranelibrary.org),
is practically never a viable option for road safety research. In road
safety, we have to work most of the time with quasi-experimental
research designs, as we lack full control of assignment of a treatment
or intervention to a target group and our control groups are not fully
comparable to the treatment groups. Two procedures are used in road
safety to reduce the risk of drawing the wrong conclusions: application
of a method called meta-analysis and the use of safety performance
indicators when building up evidence for a causal chain between policy
output and safety effects.
A meta-analysis may be performed to achieve a higher statistical
power and to weigh results from different studies based on sample
size andquality of individual studies. So,meta-analysis combines results
from different studies to identify a weighted effect size. A wide range of
individual evaluation studies for single road safety interventions in
speciﬁc situations is available [10].
Another approach is the use of safety performance indicators (SPIs)
as an intermediate step to establish road safety effects [11,12]. Safety
performance indicators are the measures (indicators) reﬂecting those
operational conditions of the road trafﬁc system which inﬂuence the
system's safety performance. The purposes of SPIs are 1) to reﬂect the
current safety conditions of a road trafﬁc system (i.e. they are not neces-
sarily considered in the context of a speciﬁc safety measure, but in the
context of speciﬁc safety problems or safety gaps), 2) to measure the
inﬂuence of various safety interventions and 3) to compare different
road trafﬁc systems (e.g. countries, regions, etc.).
This approach starts by establishing if policies have been imple-
mented, how they changed SPIs and how these changes can be isolated
from other inﬂuences (confounding factors). Next, it has to be deter-
mined how an SPI is causally related to outcome indicators such as
number of people killed or seriously injured.
This approach can be illustrated, for instance, by considering the
safety effects of increased seat belt wearing. If we measure a change inIntervention
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Fig. 3. Relationship between intervention, and intermediate (SPIs) and outcome indicators.the extent of seatbelt wearing in a population of car drivers as a result
of an enforcement and mass media campaigns (Arrow 1: changing
wearing rates), knowing the effectiveness of seat belts (Arrow 2) in
preventing fatalities [13] and the number of people killed in car crashes
before the intervention started, it is possible to estimate the number of
people saved due to increased wearing rates.
Ex-ante evaluation is carried out to support decision-making on
certain interventions that are, for instance, considered for inclusion
in a road safety strategy. It uses results from ex-post evaluations, that
may be collected in a meta-analysis. Ex-ante research in the ﬁeld
of road safety does not have a very mature theoretical basis and
approaches used are similar in structure but greatly differ in assump-
tions and details. Ex-ante research only delivers good quality results if
good quality road safety data are available. Ex-ante evaluation of multi-
ple interventions has to deal with a potential interaction and overlap
between interventions [14].
Transferability of research results from one setting to another (also
called external validity) deals with generalisation of the ﬁndings.
When performing ex-ante evaluations, external validity has to be
assumed; otherwise this research would be meaningless. OECD/ITF
[15] identiﬁes two methods to assess external validity: a deductive
and an inductive approach. The deductive approach is based on a theo-
retical interpretation of the ﬁndings. Sometimes, such an approach is pos-
sible (impact of speed changes on risks/injuries), at other times it is not,
especially in caseswhere behavioural adaptations to interventions cannot
be excluded [16]. The inductive approach is based on the stability of re-
search resultswhen replicating the same interventionunder different set-
tings in space (countries) and time. A large variability of reported effects
of interventions should generate cautiousness. Variation in results may
have different reasons: a random variation (for example, related to a
small sample size), or a systematic variation (related to differences in in-
terventions or the context of an intervention, but also to poor research de-
sign if it does not control well for confounding factors).
In Section 2, the three issues are discussed in four case studies from
four different jurisdictions: the State of Western Australia in Australia,
the Netherlands, Sweden and Switzerland. Section 3 goes into how
(good) data systems and knowledge (from research) are essential to
support road safety management.
2. Road safety management: cases from Western Australia, the
Netherlands, Sweden and Switzerland
The issues raised in Section 1 are dealt with in many road safety
strategies and a group of four jurisdictions was selected for further
elaboration. This selection was based on the information presented in
a Special Issue of Safety Science [3] on Scientiﬁc Research on Road Safety
Management (www.sciencedirect.com). These four jurisdictions are rel-
atively safe (withmortality rates in 2013 of 7.6 inWestern Australia, 3.4
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European Union) and are at the forefront of road safety management
using ‘evidence-based and data-driven’ policies. It is interesting to
compare road safety management in these four jurisdictions in order
to learn how they deal with the issues raised in Section 1. Since we
did not select the four cases randomly, we don't claim any generalisa-
tion of the results presented. However, other countries could certainly
learn from these experiences.
2.1. Western Australia
The State ofWestern Australia (WA) developed a road safety strategy
for the period 2008–2020 using the WA Safe System Matrix [17,18]. The
starting point of this matrix, inspired by the Swedes and the Dutch, is
the Safe System approach, and potential interventions are classiﬁed
using two axes: one axis includes safe roads/roadsides, safe speeds, safe
vehicles and safe road use, the other axis shows regional breakdowns:
all ofWA,Metropolitan Perth (the capital city), RegionalWA and Remote
WA. Western Australia invited Monash University Accident Research
Centre (MUARC) researchers to develop an optimal safety strategy
for Western Australia based on a model earlier applied for Australia
[19]. The modelling work includes evidence-based estimates of the
effectiveness of individual road safety initiatives as a combination of
initiatives to forecast savings in serious casualties for a 12-year period
from 2008–2020. Individual countermeasures are combined to strategy
‘packages’ and the individual effectiveness ismultiplied, if they act upon
the same pool of serious casualties in order to avoid double-counting of
savings.
These savings are estimated relative to the level of serious casualties
that could be expected to occur in the absence of a signiﬁcant road
safety strategy. Two inﬂuenceswere taken into account, as a continuous
point of reference, to predict future developments: future growth in
serious casualties as a result of increasing exposure (2.6% per annum),
based on measured growth between 2001 and 2005. Secondly, it was
assumed that serious casualty rates (serious casualty per vehicle
kilometre travelled) will drop by an estimated 1.6% per annum based
on trends from 1990–1996.
Results of these exercises in terms of serious casualty savings over
the 12-year life of the strategy were grouped into safer infrastructure,
enhanced enforcement, speed limit reduction, vehicle safety measures
and aggregate behaviour change programme. If implemented in isola-
tion, the contribution on savings is almost similar in all ﬁve groups. If
these interventions were made in combination, a reduction of about
50% in serious casualties was to be expected in 2020.
Parallel to this modelling work, an extensive community consulta-
tion programme took place. The community was in strong support
of initiatives aimed at maximising compliance with the road rules
amongst road users, improving the road network and enhancing the
safety of vehicles. The community was more divided on reducing
speed limits in regional, urban and shopping areas.
The Road Safety Council in Western Australia (the legislated peak
advisory group to Government) concluded from the work of MUARC
and the results of the community consultation that it could support
all proposed measures except for a system-based speed limit reduc-
tion and the effectiveness of certain proposed infrastructure invest-
ments. Using these decisions, MUARC published a ‘reﬁnement’ of
their initial report [20]. The Road Safety Council recommended to
the Government a new Strategy Towards Zero 2008–2020 [17]. This
strategy was endorsed by the Government and presented to the
Parliament. The implementation of interventions and the progress
made in bringing down the number of people killed and seriously
injured, are closely monitored and a set of key safety performance
indicators has been developed. Western Australia has adopted a
‘Management by Results’ approach on an annual basis similar
to the Swedish ‘Management by Objectives’ approach. This involves
annual reviews of progress against the baseline ﬁgures (i.e. 2005–2007). The aim of this review is to determine whether or not
Western Australia is on track in reaching its 2020 target (i.e. 40%
reduction over the 12-year period of the Strategy). Based on this
review priorities are established and budget allocations are made.
Although annual reviews describe the progress made, they do not
report on formal evaluation studies that have been carried out
‘explaining’ the effectiveness of interventions and used in this
mid-term review. However, ex-post evaluation studies are carried
out on subjects such as speed limit reductions, speed enforcement
strategies, novice drivers, alcohol and drugs.
2.2. The Netherlands
Road safety forecasting and ex-ante evaluation play an important
role in decision-making on Dutch road safety policies. This is of rele-
vance because the Netherlands have been working with quantitative
targets for several decades and design road safety strategies regularly.
The Netherlands follow a bottom-up approach, meaning that ambitious
but realistic targets are deﬁned and updated on the basis of expected
trends in casualties.
The prevailing policy plan (Road Safety Strategic Plan 2008–2020,
From, for and by everyone) [21] has separate targets for fatalities and
serious injuries (MAIS2+). Every four years, it is checked whether the
targets for fatalities and serious injuries are still achievable andwhether
the current policy strategy should be adjusted. This process starts with
forecasts for the numbers of fatalities and serious injuries, based on a
two-step approach [22]. First, extrapolation of past casualty rate trends
for different road user categories are combined with forecasts on
distances travelled (using a lowest and highest scenario). Secondly,
the extrapolation is corrected for changes in road safety policies based
on the assumption that known changes in policies don't allow for
extrapolation of past trends. This approach is similar to the approach
proposed by Broughton and Knowles [23].
Forecasts in 2011 showed that the target for serious road injuries in
2020 was not very likely to be met without additional measures. As a
result, the Minister of Infrastructure and the Environment decided to
update the Strategic Plan. This process in which also other stakeholders
such as provinces, municipalities, police and interest groups were
involved, resulted in a proposal for additional policy (Policy Impulse
for Road Safety). An ex-ante evaluation of the proposed policy was
carried out [22], following a similar approach as the one proposed by
Siegrist [24]. The ex-ante evaluation showed that also with the Policy
Impulse, the target for seriously injured was still not likely to be
achieved in 2020. The forecasts and ex-ante evaluation of the Policy
Impulsewas carried out impartially, i.e. without any of the stakeholders
responsible for designing the Policy Impulse being involved.
From the ex-ante evaluation of the Policy Impulse, it could be
concluded that the current target for serious injuries was not achievable
anymore. However, there appeared to be no political support for reduc-
tion of the ambition. Therefore, the Minister of Infrastructure and the
Environment decided to postpone the decision on the possible adjust-
ment of the serious injury target. The decision will be based on updated
forecasts. In the meanwhile, a broad political and societal discussion on
additional, more expensive and far-reaching measures will take place.
Ex-post evaluations of Dutch policy interventions are incidental, and
not mandatory or customary in Dutch road safety policy-making.
There are some exceptions, however. In the past, some individual
measures like the construction of roundabouts, separate bicycle tracks
and enforcement on seat belt use were evaluated. Moreover, an evalua-
tion of the effectiveness of a trial on accompanied driving is foreseen in
2015/2016. On amore aggregate policy level, the evaluation of ten years
of implementation of Sustainable Safety measures is relevant [25].
This study concluded that all measures together prevented 300–400
fatalities in 2007 and had a beneﬁt–cost ratio of 3.6: 1.
It is evident from the description of the evaluation work that a
substantial amount of assumptions needs to be made in the process.
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levels and of the effectiveness of new policy measures. A complicating
factor with regard to new policy measures is that policy plans often
discuss broad actions rather than speciﬁc measures. As a result, assump-
tions have to be made concerning detailing policy into speciﬁc measures.
Finally, also the mobility forecasts are based on certain assumptions, e.g.
demographic and economic developments.
2.3. Sweden
Vision Zero was introduced by the Swedish Parliament in 1997 [26].
The Vision, which intends to be holistic and systemic, has formed the
basis for road safety work over the past decades. Vision Zero differs
fundamentally from earlier approaches to improve road safety and is
seen as one of the ‘Safe System’ approaches in the world [27]. Safe Sys-
tem is expressed most formally in the road safety policies of the
Netherlands and Sweden known as Sustainable Safety and Vision Zero
respectively. This approach is common in other transport systems and
has determined safety programmes in aviation, rail and shipping for
several decades. The long-term goal of Vision Zero is that no-one is
killed or seriously injured as a result of road crashes and consequently
implies a transport system free of health losses. This goal was based
on the idea that it is ethically unacceptable to formulate any other
goal. However, it triggered a discussion in Sweden on acceptable levels
of safety (more than zero) and the price the Swedish society iswilling to
pay for eliminating risks versus an acceptable risk level.
Today, Vision Zero is a politically adopted public road safety policy
with broad political support [28]. One important component of Vision
Zero is the shared responsibility between the ‘system designers’ e.g.
national agencies, local authorities etc. and the ‘systemusers’, e.g. differ-
ent road users. One key principle in this chain of responsibility is that
the amenability to prevent injuries both starts and endswith the system
designers. Today, Vision Zero forms the basis for policy developments.
With such a target, an ex-ante evaluation is not required, nor is a
cost–beneﬁt analysis. Since 2009, Vision Zero has been linked to an
interim target for 2020: the number of fatalities should be no more
than half of the average number in the period 2006–2008, and seriously
injured a quarter less.
When Vision Zero was introduced, a target of 50% reduction of
fatalities between 1997 and 2007 was formulated. This goal was not
reached. An evaluation showed that a target for the reduction of the
number of fatalities ten years ahead does not give enough guidance to
thevarious stakeholders onwhat they can to do to achieve it. The interim
target for 2020 is now complemented by a framework called ‘Manage-
ment by Objectives’. Most of these objectives are formulated in terms
of (well-known) SPIs on human behaviour: compliance with speed
limits, drinking and driving, seat belt wearing, crash helmets, safe cars,
and safe motorcycles (ABS) but also safe national roads, safe municipal
streets and better operation and maintenance of bicycle facilities.
Progress ismeasured annually [29,30] and the results of progress reports
are discussed every year at a safety conference of stakeholders. In parallel
to the ﬁrst target for years 1997–2007, a methodology was developed
called OLA: objective data, list of solutions/actions, and addressed action
plans. TheOLAmethodologywas usedwhen statistics showed an impor-
tant road safety issue (e.g. too many killed moped drivers). The aim of
OLA was to have different stakeholders work together and thus solve a
road safety issue. The use of this methodology has had an important
impact as it committed stakeholders to implementing solutions and
not just recognizing a problem. Today, OLA is used as a complement to
the Management by Objectives framework. If an SPI or a speciﬁc road
user group is recognised as problematic, an OLA could be launched to
try and ﬁnd out the best solution to solve the problem.
The 2014 progress report [30] assesses whether recent develop-
ments suggest that targets in 2020 are within reach. It also discusses
whether external developments might inﬂuence this assessment
(weather, demography, economy). And ﬁnally progress on all roadsafety performance indicators is discussed. The main conclusion is
that “it is reasonable to expect that continued efforts will allow us
to achieve the 2020 interim targets both for fatalities and seriously
injured but with the reservation that the level of road safety for
bicyclists must increase to reach the injury goal”. This conclusion
comes from comparing the annual fatality reduction in the years
2008–2013 (8%) with a required further reduction (5% annually).
It is further concluded that a better connection should be made
between the SPI developments and the development in the number
of fatalities and injuries. It was also decided that the targets and
the mix of SPIs should be evaluated in 2016.
The main focus of Vision Zero is to control the kinetic energy in the
road transport system. To this end, several interventions have been
implemented in Swedenwith the aim of avoiding collisions and lowering
speeds. Examples are an increase of roundabouts, the introduction of
speed cameras and a new type of so called ‘2 + 1 lane’ rural roads
with median cable barriers between opposite directions. According
to the ex-postevaluations of these interventions, single vehicle and
head-on crashes have been reduced signiﬁcantly between 2000 and
2010, largely as a result of these median barriers and the installation
of Electronic Stability Control in cars [31]. An evaluation of the
large-scale use of roundabouts in an urban area [32] showed that the
roundabouts reduced the speed considerably at the junctions and on
the connecting sections between them. The result indicated an overall
decrease in accident risk by 44%. The Swedish speed camera system
is one of the largest in the world [33]. A more modern version of auto-
matic trafﬁc safety control (ATSC) was introduced in Sweden in 2006.
The primary aim of the Swedish ATSC is to reduce speed on the sections
equipped with cameras and thus decrease the number of fatalities and
injuries. An evaluation showed a reduction of fatalities by about 30%
and the number of fatalities and severely injured by about 25% [34].
2.4. Switzerland
Siegrist [24] identiﬁes three important questions that have to be
answered in supporting policy-making on road safety using ex-ante
information: what is the estimated effect of a measure in a given
situation? What will be the net effect of a set of countermeasures
(‘a programme’) and thirdly, what will be the return on investments
for the national economy. According to Siegrist, the effects of a single
measure are determined by ﬁve factors. It starts with identifying a
high-priority accident type (A), that could be implemented (B) and is
effective (C), when application is widespread (D) andwhen compliance
is sufﬁcient (E). By multiplying all factors, a number of preventable
fatalities can be estimated. The theoretical potential A (total number
of casualties to be prevented) for prevention will not be reached
because of the B–E factors. These factors are not constant in time.
Siegrist reports on a three-step approach for estimating effects of
safety programmes, that comprise a multitude of measures. In step 1,
a theoretical beneﬁt is estimated. Step 2 deals with potential overlap
(different measure targeting the same crash types) and step 3 relates
to synergies that can increase the effects of single measures.
The outlined method has been applied on the Swiss road safety
programme Via sicura [35]. The programme was adopted by the parlia-
ment in 2012 [36]. Before taking a decision, the politicians were
informed about the results of the study. Implementation of Via sicura
is expected to result in a reduction of, on average, 70 to 80 fatalities
and 850 to 950 serious injuries less, during the ﬁrst ten years. This
represents a reduction of fatalities by a third and of serious injuries by
a quarter. The forecasted safety effects correspond with an economical
net beneﬁt of 250 million Swiss Francs annually.
The communication towards decision makers focused on the
expected number of prevented fatalities and severe injuries (public
health perspective). It was the intention for politicians to base their
decision mainly on this information. Nevertheless, as a secondary
criterion, the effects on national economy were calculated and
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formed on the material net beneﬁt of the whole programme as well as
of each single measure. Of course, it is not certain that both criteria
lead to same conclusions. In Switzerland, the results of a cost–beneﬁt
analysis should always be revealed even if they are contradictory to
the main effects on public health. The economic criterion is also impor-
tant at the singlemeasure level. Politicians should have the possibility to
prioritize the measures that have a good cost–beneﬁt ratio.
After the adoption of the national road safety programme Via sicura
[36], a range of safetymeasureswasprogressively implemented, includ-
ing infrastructural measures: road authorities are now obliged by
law to check and improve the road network. Instruments facilitating
implementation of infrastructure improvements were developed, local
staffs were trained and progress data were collected and published.
In addition, a monitoring system was established. A yearly updated
study reports on the trends in several road safety indicators [37].
Additionally, in 2013 a multi-level ex-post evaluation – which not
only represents a control but also a steering instrument for further
policy developments – was planned.
Although the method applied in Switzerland represents an improve-
ment for forecasts in comparison to the uniform use of single evaluation
results, some methodological shortcomings limit the validity of the
results. The question still remains how the calculated potential of a safety
programme can take into account the predicted trend in accident rates. In
two Swiss studies [35,38] this trend was determined on the assumption
that the intensity of work in the area of road safety would remain con-
stant. As earlier efforts also included the introduction of new safety mea-
sures, at least some of the beneﬁts of the programme are already included
in the general trend. The method described here offers the possibility to
determine the potential of a programme. However, adjustment to allow
for the trend (as determined by the suggested methodology) cannot be
done accurately, as the size of the overlap is not quantiﬁed.
The estimation of the combined effect of safety measures was based
on the assumption that the effect of a single measure may be correlated
with the effect of another measure. Based on studies that evaluated the
effect of multiple road safety interventions introduced at the same
‘target group’, Elvik [14] showed that indeed a conservative estimation
of the whole programme effect is reasonable. This view supports the
method applied in Switzerland.
Without any doubt, the presented ex-ante evaluation method was
crucial for the development and political acceptance of the Swiss
national road safety programme. The study based on this method had
a remarkable impact, as it forecast the effectiveness of safety measures,
taking into account existing scientiﬁc research, an estimate of the
degree of implementation that can be expected at a certain point in
time, and the interaction between individual measures. Decision
makers in Switzerland expressed their interest in getting information
about the expected safety impact of interventions and – additionally –
whether the expected beneﬁts justify the investments.
2.5. Conclusion after comparing road safety management in four
jurisdictions
All four jurisdictions apply similar approaches and tools for
supporting road safety policy-making and the observed differences
are marginal. It is striking that road safety strategies and the under-
pinning scientiﬁc work are well documented and published, also in
peer-reviewed journals. All four jurisdictions have quantiﬁed targets
(outcome indicators on people killed and injured in a road crash
in absolute terms for a speciﬁc year, mostly 2020) and ex-ante eval-
uations (or modelling as the ‘Australians’ call that work) elucidate
how to decide on certain targets. All approaches are based on a com-
bination of extrapolations of historical trends combined with
estimates of safety effects of new interventions. The appliedmethods
and their results are widely accepted as a basis for decision-making.
Progress monitoring takes place in all four jurisdictions and agrowing interest can be observed in using safety performance indi-
cators (SPIs) for that purpose. SPIs are not yet well linked to outcome
indicators. Ex-post evaluations are carried out incidentally and not
systematically and no clear signals are presented about feedback
from ex-post to ex-ante evaluations. The approach adopted in the
four jurisdictions is ‘data-hungry’ but without good road safety
data, this approach will be unworkable. International scientiﬁc
knowledge is applied widely. However, limited attention is paid to
transferability to local conditions.
3. Data collection and analysis for evidence-based policymaking
In this chapter,wewill see how ‘evidence-based anddata-driven’ road
safety management uses two pillars: road safety data and statistics, and
scientiﬁc knowledge. It is assumed that such an approach will be more
effective and more efﬁcient than traditional approaches (Johnston,
2010). However, the four cases (Western Australia, the Netherlands,
Sweden and Switzerland) show that fully evidence-based and data-
driven road safety management is too complicated at the moment and
not a realistic option. The four cases illustrate that we don't have proven
methodologies yet, and that sometimes there are not enough good data
to claim a solid scientiﬁc basis for road safety management.
On the other hand, we see that all four jurisdictions have made
progress over the years when it comes to developing methodologies.
This learning-by-doing is heavily based on working with quantitative
road safety targets, on carrying out systematic ex-post evaluations and
on using good research results as much as possible, for example the
results of meta-analysis of road safety interventions. It is obvious from
the four cases that good quality data systems are required to support
road safety management.
Road safetymanagement can only be effective if decisionmakers trust
the modelling work from researchers and are willing to accept these
results. Of course, a political dimension is always present in these deci-
sionswhendecisionmakers have to balance positive safety effects against
costs and against side effects. Public acceptance or community support is
another relevant aspect to include in ﬁnal decision-making, as is clear
from the Western Australia example on speed reduction.
A key issue when designing a road safety strategy is deﬁning a
so-called baseline: what would be the level of fatalities and seriously
injured in the absence of signiﬁcant additional road safety interventions.
All four jurisdiction use some form of extrapolation, sometimes based
on prediction of crashes and sometimes on underlying developments
(like in the Netherlands where predictions of crash rates and mobility
is done independently and then combined). Extrapolation accepts the
assumption that time trends in the past will continue in the future.
But one simply does not know if this assumption is correct. That is the
reason why Hauer [39] proposed another approach: predict causes of
an evolution and based on that predict a future. From the four cases it
is clear that such a procedure is too ambitious at this stage. So, this is
considered a key issue in further research.
All jurisdictions suffer from the reality that it is not equally easy for the
various road safety interventions to carry out ex-ante and ex-post evalu-
ations. For vehicles mainly dealing with passive safety (design, legisla-
tion) and infrastructure design/operations, evaluations are relatively
easy. Also interventions dealing with speed management (changing
speed limits, police enforcement, physical measures to reduce speed)
are well documented. Two major areas have caused problems until
now: behavioural adaptation and effects of educational interventions.
All four jurisdictions are confronted with this. Furthermore, results of sci-
entiﬁc studies on behavioural changes are not easy to transfer to other
settings because of cultural differences between countries.
The SUNﬂower pyramid with its different levels/layers turns out to
be an excellent framework for road safety management and its related
data collection system. The introduction of the intermediate level (safe-
ty performance indicators) is seen as a verywelcome addition.Monitor-
ing progress using SPIs provides far better understanding than
25F. Wegman et al. / IATSS Research 39 (2015) 19–25monitoring outcome indicators only. The approach in Sweden (Man-
agement by Objectives) and Western Australia (Managing by Results)
seems to be the way forward especially if it becomes possible to link
SPI progress with road safety targets (quantitatively in terms of fewer
people killed and injured in road crashes) and with a proper under-
standing of why progress was made, using results of ex-post evalua-
tions. From an effectiveness perspective, a target should be set in
numbers, not in rates nor solely based on cost–beneﬁt rankings.
A key component of a Safe System approach is a concept of shared
responsibility, not only between the road users on the one hand and
road trafﬁc designers/operators on the other. But also between different
designers and operators: municipalities, police forces, road authorities,
driver training and testing institutions, and the private sector. If the
contributions of different stakeholders are identiﬁed (in a road safety
strategy, for example), periodic progress monitoring is an excellent
means of assessing if one keeps up one's promises.
It is observed that measuring SPIs could be expensive, especially if
results are required frequently and at a disaggregated (local) level. It
is therefore recommended to develop new methods to measure good
quality SPIs more efﬁciently.
Based on the four cases, socio-economic costs do not seem to play a
prominent role when designing a road safety strategy. Perhaps this item
is of relevancewhen it comes to comparing road safetywith other threats
to public health.
Road safety data and statistics are essential for road safety manage-
ment as is clearly illustrated in all four cases, and it cannot be over-
emphasised how relevant good road safety data are. As road safety
research and road safety management become more international, it is
recommended to pay attention to the harmonization of deﬁnitions
and data collection procedures. This will allow for better international
comparison and, as a consequence, for facilitating the jurisdictions in
learning from each other. Three areas deserve special attention:
• estimation of costs: cost estimates are relevant for indicating the socio-
economic impact of road crashes (and compare that to other health
threats) and to make cost–beneﬁt resp. cost-effectiveness estimates.
Until now, countries have not been using a standardized format,
whichmeans that reliable comparisons are difﬁcult or even impossible.
• measuring exposure (to risk) is a very relevant component of road
safety: it should be clear if changes in numbers of people killed or
injured are the result of a lower exposure or a lower risk. Measuring
exposure to underpin road safety management decisions deserves
more attention. Since the costs of collecting these data could be high,
new methodologies and modern technologies (ICT) should be used to
make exposure data available, especiallywhen information is requested
at a disaggregate level.
• including high-quality data on (serious) injuries, next to estimates on
crash fatalities. These data are not necessarily reported by the police;
but appear in health sector data, mainly coming from hospitals.
A challenge is to make the two systems (health and police) compatible
or at least linkable with each other and thus increase the quality of
injury data. Both data on fatalities and (serious) injuries should be
checked for underreporting regularly and procedures (improvement
of data collection systems and linking of data from different sources)
should be put into place to correct for underreporting.
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